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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-IMPOSING
LIABILITY ON NEWSPAPER FOR PUBLISHING NAME OF RAPE VIC-
TIM OBTAINED FROM PUBLICLY RELEASED POLICE REPORT VIO-
LATES FIRST AMENDMENT. Florida Star v. B.JF, 109 S. Ct. 2603
(1989).
On October 29, 1983, The Florida Star, a Jacksonville, Florida,
weekly newspaper, reported that an unidentified man had robbed and
sexually assaulted a local woman.' Contrary to its policy and usual
procedure regarding sexual offenses, the newspaper published the
name of the victim in the article.2 B.J.F.3 sued The Florida Star for
negligently publishing her name in violation of a Florida law4 which
prohibited identifying the victim of a sexual offense in "any instru-
ment of mass communication." 5
1. The woman reported the assault to the Duval County, Florida, Sheriff's Department
on October 20, 1989. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2605 (1989).
2. The Florida Star had never published the name of a sexual assault victim prior to the
publication of B.J.F.'s name. Note, The Imposition of Strict Civil Liability on a Media Defend-
ant for Publication of Truthful, Lawfully Obtained Information, 18 STETSON L. REV. 119, 120
n.12 (1988).
3. The initials of the sexual assault victim were substituted for her full name by the
Florida District Court of Appeals sua sponte "in order to preserve [her] privacy interests." 109
S. Ct. at 2605 n.2 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883, 883 n.* (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986)).
4. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987) stated:
Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim.-No
person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, published,
or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other
identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense within this chapter.
An offense under this section shall constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree
5. Id. The United States Supreme Court's opinion did not make clear whether the basis
for B.J.F.'s action was common law negligence (relying upon violation of the statute as negli-
gence per se) or an implied civil right of action directly under the statute. See Florida Star, 109
S. Ct. at 2607. The distinction may not have been clear to the Court. Negligence per se
applies when a statute is interpreted as setting a standard of care from which it is negligent to
deviate. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 220 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. Claims predicated on negligence
per se are not statutory in nature. Negligence per se simply substitutes a statutory standard of
care for the general standard applicable in negligence cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 874A comment e (1979). On the contrary, where a statute is construed to imply a
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A "Police Reports" column, comprised of articles describing lo-
cal criminal offenses reported to the Sheriff's Department, regularly
appeared in The Florida Star.6 The newspaper obtained information
for the section from the Department's press room where crime inci-
dent reports were made available to the public on an unrestricted ba-
sis.7 The names of sexual assault victims were not normally included
in the reports.8 Signs posted in the press room stated that the names
of sexual assault victims were not a matter of public record and were
not to be published.9
The crime report regarding B.J.F.'s sexual assault, which was
made available in the press room, inadvertently included her name. 10
A Florida Star reporter-trainee copied the information verbatim from
the crime report and delivered it to the newspaper office.I Another
reporter then transcribed the information into a newspaper article
without deleting the victim's name.' 2 As a result, B.J.F.'s full name
appeared in the published article.' 3
civil right of action, the action is a statutory one. The court creates a new remedy based upon
its determination that a tort remedy "is consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate
for promoting its policy and needed to assure its effectiveness." Id. at § 874A comment h, at
308.
B.J.F. confused these separate doctrines in her complaint, where she alleged "an implied
civil cause of action of negligence per se based upon the criminal sanctions" imposed by the
statute. Note, supra note 2, at 121. The Court never completely untangled this inaccurate
intertwining of distinct concepts. At one point, Justice Marshall, author of the majority opin-
ion, referred to "the broad sweep of the negligence per se standard applied under the civil cause
of action implied from § 794.03." 109 S. Ct. at 2612.
Justice White's dissent delineated more clearly that the cause of action was one for negli-
gence, relying upon the doctrine of negligence per se setting the proper standard of care, and
not an action under the statute itself. He noted that: "After all, the lawsuit against the Star
which is at issue here is not an action for violating the statute.., but is, more accurately, for the
negligent publication of appellee's name." Id. at 2617 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 2605.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2605-06. The reporter admitted she knew that names of sexual assault victims
were not to be taken from the Sheriff's Department. Id. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2606. The rewrite reporter stated that she regarded the incident as a robbery
and inadvertently included B.J.F.'s name in the article. Note, supra note 2, at 121 n.20.
13. The article read as follows:
[B.J.F.] reported on Thursday, October 20, she was crossing Brentwood Park, which
is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard, enroute [sic] to her bus stop, when an
unknown black man ran up behind the lady and placed a knife to her neck and told
her not to yell. The suspect then undressed the lady and had sexual intercourse with
her before fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch and gold necklace. Pa-
trol efforts have been suspended concerning this incident because of lack of evidence.
109 S. Ct. at 2606.
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B.J.F. brought an action for negligence against the Sheriff's De-
partment and The Florida Star, relying upon their violation of Florida
Statutes section 794.03 as constituting negligence per se.' 4 B.J.F. set-
tled with the Sheriff's Department while her claim against The Flor-
ida Star proceeded to trial. 5 The Florida Star's defense was that it
lawfully obtained B.J.F.'s name from the Sheriff's Department and
that it inadvertently published the name.1 6 The newspaper also chal-
lenged the constitutionality of section 794.03.17
The trial court upheld the statute's constitutionality and granted
B.J.F.'s motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the newspa-
per was negligent per sel8 in violating section 794.03.19 The jury, left
only with the issues of causation and damages, awarded B.J.F.
$75,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.20
The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed 2' and the Florida
Supreme Court denied review.22
The United States Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, re-
versed the Florida District Court of Appeals.23 The Court held that
the imposition of damages against The Florida Star for publishing the
name of B.J.F. as the victim of a sexual assault violated the freedom
of the press protected by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution.24 Following the principle enunciated in Smith v. Daily
14. Id. See supra notes 4 and 5.
15. 109 S. Ct. at 2606. The Sheriff's Department agreed to a $2,500 settlement. Id.
B.J.F. stated that while she was recovering from the assault in the local hospital, a co-
worker brought the article to her attention. Note, supra note 2, at 119. She also asserted that
"her mother had received several threatening phone calls from a man who stated that he
would rape B.J.F. again; and that these events had forced B.J.F. to change her phone number
and residence, to seek police protection, and to obtain mental health counseling." 109 S. Ct. at
2606.
16. 109 S. Ct. at 2606. The editor-in-chief of The Florida Star stated that, although he
was not aware of FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987) prohibiting publication of the name of a sexual
assault victim, the newspaper had always refrained from printing such information. Note,
supra note 2, at 120 n.12.
17. 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
18. See supra note 5.
19. 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
20. Id. The trial judge reduced the award to $97,500 by subtracting the $2,500 settlement
B.J.F. received from the Sheriff's Department. Id.
21. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam).
"Reaching the merits, we find that the information published, the rape victim's name, was of a
private nature and not to be published as a matter of law." Id. at 884.
22. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1987).
23. 109 S. Ct. at 2605.
24. Id. at 2608. "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Mail Publishing Co. ,25 the Court held that since the information was
lawfully obtained and truthful, the newspaper could not be held liable
absent "a state interest of the highest order."2 6 Florida Star v. B.J.F,
109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
In Florida Star the Court faced an issue that courts have strug-
gled with since the early English common law: whether punishment
may be exacted upon one who has merely spoken the truth. Although
the concept of truth as an affirmative defense to a defamation charge
is generally accepted today,2 7 this was not always the case. Under
early English common law, truth did not constitute a defense to crim-
inal defamation actions. 28 Authorities are divided concerning the ini-
tial recognition of truth as a defense to civil actions.29 While the
general assumption is that truth was always an available defense,
30
some contrary authority suggests the outdated criminal defamation
maxim of "the greater the truth, the greater the libel"31 was applica-
25. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
26. Id. at 2613.
27. See PROSSER, supra note 5, § 116.
28. Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43, 44 (1931). In earlier common
law, falsity was an important element in a libel charge. Id. at 44 n.3. The rule that truth was
not a defense to a criminal defamation charge originated with the Star Chamber during the
reign of James I. Id. at 44.
The theory upon which this doctrine was based was that where it was honestly be-
lieved that a person had committed a crime, it was the duty of him who so believed to
cause the offender to be prosecuted and brought to justice, and that to neglect this
duty and publish the offense to the world, thereby bringing the party into disgrace or
ridicule without opportunity to show by the judgment of a court that he was inno-
cent, was libelous. If the matter charged were in fact true, the injury caused by the
publication was much greater than where the publication was false. Further, the ill-
advised publication of the truth concerning a person would be more likely to provoke
him to a breach of the peace than would the publication of a falsehood which he
could disprove.
Id. at 45. See Fox's Libel Act, 37 Stat. at L., 32 Geo. II, ch. 60, cited in Ray, supra note 28, at
46.
This rule was abolished by Lord Campbell's Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 96, 6 (1843).
PROSSER, supra note 5, § 116, at 840.
Originally courts in the United States adopted the common law rule that truth was no
defense. Id. at 840. (citing Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 176 (1811)); People
v. Croswell, 3 John. 337 (N.Y. 1804). However, the rule soon proved contrary to the public
policy of encouraging publication of the truth. Nearly all the states have made truth a com-
plete defense in criminal defamation actions "provided that it is published with good motives
and for justifiable ends." Id.
29. Ray, supra note 28, at 49.
30. Id. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 840.
31. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 840. The Scottish poet Robert Burns credited Lord Mans-
field with the adage:
Dost know that Old Mansfield
Who writes like the Bible,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
ble to civil actions as well. 2 For instance, there is evidence that until
1735 courts admitted evidence of truth only to mitigate damages.
3
Yet, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, truth was widely rec-
ognized as an affirmative defense to civil defamation actions.3 4
Various justifications for the defense have been offered. Some say
the defense protects the defendant for performing a public service by
disclosing the repugnant nature or acts of the plaintiff to society.35
Others assert that, like the "unclean hands" doctrine, 6 it prevents a
wrongdoer from recovering for the truthful disclosure of his deeds.3 7
Still others justify the defense on first amendment grounds: the fear of
being sued should not curtail the publication of truthful informa-
tion." Whatever the reason, a majority of courts in the United States
now recognize truth as an affirmative defense to a civil charge of
defamation. 39
However, while truth became firmly entrenched as a defense to
defamation claims, new possibilities for punishing the publication of
truthful information arose with recognition of the separate tort of in-
vasion of privacy. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis were the
first to recognize the existence of such a tort in their seminal law re-
view article published in 1890.14 The authors advocated the recogni-
tion of a new legal right to combat what they believed to be the
unnecessary intrusion by the press into the private lives of others.4'
The views of Warren and Brandeis undoubtedly reflected the
popular feelings of society at that time. During the late nineteenth
century the motto "[m]ind your own business"42 became popular and
United States citizens jealously guarded their private concerns.43
Says the more 'tis a truth, sir,
The more 'tis a libel?
R. Burns, "The Reproof," quoted in PROSSER, supra note 5, at 840.
32. Comment, The Truth Hurts: A Critique of a Defense to Defamation, 35 VA. L. REV.
425, 429 (1949). See Ray, supra note 28, at 49.
33. Comment, supra note 32, at 430 n.l1.
34. Ray, supra note 28, at 50.
35. Ray, supra note 28, at 51. See PROSSER, note 5, at 840.
36. The "unclean hands" doctrine is based on the concept that one who has committed a
wrong is "not entitled to relief in equity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1367 (5th ed. 1979).
37. Ray, supra note 28, at 51. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 840.
38. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 840.
39. Id. at 840. See Ray, supra note 28, at 5 1.
40. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
41. Id. at 195-96.
42. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892,
1904 (1981).
43. Id. at 1907.
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However, the unprecedented rise in "yellow journalism"" and society
gossip columns resulted in mass public disclosure of private details.45
In response, Warren and Brandeis asserted that the right to privacy
should be recognized.
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civ-
ilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world,
and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become
more essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and inven-
tion have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to
mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by
mere bodily injury.46
New York was the first state to grapple with the right to pri-
vacy.47 Although its lower courts had previously recognized the
existence of the right,4" the New York Court of Appeals refused to
follow suit in the 1902 case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.49 In Roberson the defendant had used pictures of a young woman
to advertise its product without her consent. 50 The decision so out-
raged New York residents that the state legislature passed a statute in
1903 making it a tort and misdemeanor to "make use of the name,
portrait or picture of a person" for advertising or trade purposes with-
out that person's consent.5 In Pavesich v. New England Life Insur-
ance 52 the Georgia Supreme Court became the first state high court to
44. The term is defined as a "[t]ype of journalism which distorts and exploits the news by
sensationalism in order to sell copies of the newspapers or magazines." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1449 (5th ed. 1979).
45. Note, supra note 42, at 1904. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
"The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of de-
cency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at
196.
There is evidence that "high society" social events given by Warren and his family were
covered in "highly personal and embarrassing detail" by the Boston press. Prosser, supra at
383.
46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at 196.
47. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 45 at 384-85.
48. Id. Manola v. Stevens (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890), an unreported decision covered in the
N.Y. Times, June 15, 18, 21, 1890, was the first case where recovery was based solely on an
invasion of the right of privacy. The court enjoined the defendant from publishing a photo-
graph of an actress who had appeared "scandously" on stage wearing tights. Prosser, supra
note 45, at 385.
49. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
50. Id. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442.
51. Prosser, supra note 45, at 385. 1903 N.Y. Laws, ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (codified as amended
at N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW 50-51 (McKinney 1921)).
52. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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judicially recognize a tort cause of action for invasion of privacy.
Under facts similar to those in Roberson,53 the Georgia court allowed
recovery against a defendant who misappropriated the plaintiff's like-
ness for commercial purposes.
In a 1960 law review article, the late Dean Prosser sorted out the
tangle of interests protected by the emerging tort of privacy by recog-
nizing that the tort in fact embodied four separate types of action.54
Most pertinent to B.J.F.'s suit was the cause of action for public dis-
closure of embarrassing but true facts about another's private life."
Prosser defined the interest protected as that of "reputation, with the
same overtones of mental distress that are present in libel and slander.
It is in reality an extension of defamation.., with the elimination of
the defense of truth.
56
Three requirements are necessary to establish a cause of action
for publication of private facts. First, the private facts must be pub-
licly disclosed. 57 The communication of facts concerning another's
private life to an individual or a small group of people does not consti-
tute publicity. 8 Second, the facts actually disclosed must be private
facts as opposed to public facts.59 Finally, the private facts disclosed
must be of the type that would be offensive and objectionable to a
53. Id. at 192, 50 S.E. at 68-69.
54. Prosser, supra note 45, at 389. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
(1977), which states:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B;
or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in § 652D;
or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the pub-
lic, as stated in § 652E.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977), which states:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind
that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
56. Prosser, supra note 45, at 398.
57. Id. at 393. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977). This differs from the
"publication" element of defamation, which is satisfied by disclosure to even one other person.
Id.
59. Prosser, supra note 45, at 394. For example, the fact that someone was married would
be a public fact because it is ascertainable from public documents. However, the fact that
someone was only living with someone would be a private fact.
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reasonable person." The Restatement (Second) of Torts adds a fourth
requirement that the private information must not be of legitimate
public concern.6
Brents v. Morgan" was the first case in which a court specifically
applied the tort of public disclosure of private information. The court
held that the defendant's posting of a sign in his garage window stat-
ing that the plaintiff owed him money constituted publicity of plain-
tiff's private matters.6 3 The 1931 case of Melvin v. Reid' 4 is the most
prominent case upholding civil liability for publishing true informa-
tion.65 The plaintiff had been not only a prostitute, but also the de-
fendant in a celebrated murder trial in which she was acquitted.66
After the trial, she married and settled down to lead a respectable
life.67 Her new friends and acquaintances were ignorant of her past.68
With the release of the movie The Red Kimono, which was based on
her life story and used her maiden name, the tranquility of her new
life abruptly ended.69 The court held that the showing of the movie
violated the plaintiff's right of privacy. 0
Courts generally have refused to find liability when the plaintiff is
unreasonably sensitive to otherwise unobjectionable publicity.7 1 In
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.72 the defendant magazine published a
biographical story revealing certain private facts about the plaintiff.
The plaintiff had been a child prodigy in mathematics,73 but when he
reached his teens he developed a disdain for math and shunned pub-
licity.74 He had retreated to a life of complete anonymity as a book-
keeper interested in Indian folklore when the defendant published the
60. Id. at 396. Prosser noted the intent of the right of privacy is not to protect the
"shrinking soul who is abnormally sensitive about such publicity." Id. at 397.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment d (1977). "Where the subject-
matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no invasion of privacy." Id.
62. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
63. Id. at 774, 299 S.W. at 971. The jury awarded the plaintiff$1,000 in damages. Id. at
768, 299'S.W. at 969.
64. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
65. Prosser, supra note 45, at 392.




70. Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93-94.
71. Prosser, supra note 45, at 397. See, e.g., Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95
S.E.2d 606 (1956) (twelve-year-old girl delivered a baby).
72. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
73. Id. at 807.
74. Id.
530 [Vol. 12:523
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article. 75 The article apparently devastated the plaintiff; he died soon
after its publication. 76 The court permitted "limited scrutiny of the
'private' life of any person who has achieved ... the . . . status of
'public figure'-77 and denied recovery.
Tort liability for public disclosure of private facts involves a deli-
cate balance between the state's interest in protecting privacy and the
free speech protections of the first amendment.78 Although the
United States Supreme Court has addressed this issue in three major
cases, 79 in each case it avoided squarely confronting whether a state
may ever constitutionally punish the publication of truth. 8° Never-
theless, in each decision, privacy rights yielded to the first
amendment.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn the Court refused to uphold
sanctions for the publication of truthful information obtained from a
public record.82 The father of a deceased rape victim brought suit
against a local television station for broadcasting the name of his
daughter while reporting the trial of the alleged offenders.83 A re-
porter for the station obtained the information from records of indict-
ments made available in the courtroom.84 A Georgia statute
prohibited the publication or broadcast of a rape victim's name.85
The father's suit alleged that the broadcast of his daughter's name by
the defendant television station violated his right to privacy and
sought civil damages based upon the statute.
86
75. Id.
76. Prosser, supra note 45, at 397.
77. Id. at 809.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) Special Note on the Relation
of § 652D to the first amendment to the Constitution.
79. See infra notes 81 through 133 and accompanying text.
80. Linder, When Names Are Not News, They're Negligence: Media Liability for Personal
Injuries Resulting from the Publication of Accurate Information, 52 UMKC L. REV. 421, 426
(1984).
81. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
82. Id. at 491. The holding of the court has been called the source-based privilege rule.
Comment, Identifying the Rape Victim: A Constitutional Clash Between the First Amendment
and the Right to Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 987, 992-93 (1985).
83. 420 U.S. at 471-74. A sexual assault victim brought the first suit against a media
defendant in Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962). The
defendant newspaper, although it did not state Hubbard's name, reported that the assailant
had sexually assaulted his sister. Because the plaintiff was the boy's only sister, she claimed
the article sufficiently identified her as the victim and invaded her right to privacy. The court
refused to hold the defendant liable because the newspaper obtained the information from
public records and the incident was newsworthy. Id. at 147-48.
84. 420 U.S. at 472.
85. Id. at 471-72.
86. Id. at 474.
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The Court held in favor of the television station on the grounds
that the station legally obtained the information from a public rec-
ord.87 The Court also noted that a primary function of the press is to
closely monitor judicial proceedings to ensure their impartiality.88
However, the majority limited its holding to the specific fact situation
presented and refused to adopt the broad rule that "the press may not
be made criminally or civilly liable for publishing information that is
neither false nor misleading but absolutely accurate, however damag-
ing it may be to reputation or individual sensibilities."89 Commenta-
tors criticized the decision for not addressing the competing interests
of the state (e.g., protecting the privacy of the rape victim) versus
freedom of the press (e.g., the public's concern in knowing the vic-
tim's name).9"
The Court followed a somewhat different approach in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.9' The newspaper published the
name of a judge under investigation by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry
and Review Commission. 92 The publication violated a state criminal
statute prohibiting the release of information pertaining to proceed-
ings before the Commission.9" Applying the "clear and present dan-
ger" test, the Court held that truthful publication concerning the
confidential proceedings posed no such risk.94 The Court noted that
whatever risk was present could be eliminated by the state's imposi-
tion of stricter procedures in the operation of the Commission to en-
sure secrecy. 95
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 96 the Court held that once
information is made public, the government cannot further restrain its
dissemination. 7 In this case the newspaper published the name of a
fourteen-year-old juvenile arrested for the murder of a classmate.
98
87. Id. at 496-97.
88. Id. at 491-92. The Court stated that "[w]ith respect to judicial proceedings in particu-
lar, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice." Id. at 492.
89. Id. at 489.
90. Linder, supra note 80, at 428-30.
91. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
92. Id. at 831.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 845. The Court stated that it has "consistently rejected the argument that...
[out-of-court comments concerning pending cases or grand jury investigations] constituted a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice." Id. at 844.
95. Id. at 845.
96. 433 U.S. 97 (1979).
97. Id. at 103.
98. Id. at 99.
[Vol. 12:523
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The publication violated a state statute requiring a written court order
before a newspaper could publish the name of a juvenile in an arti-
cle.99 The newspaper acquired the information from witnesses, the
police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney.1°° The Court held that
the statute did not sufficiently further a state interest of the highest
order.' 0 1 The Court also noted that the statute did not accomplish its
intended purpose since it only prohibited newspapers, as opposed to
other media, from identifying a juvenile offender." °2 Although the
Court took pains to limit the holdings in these three cases to their
respective facts, the cases nevertheless "demonstrate that state action
to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards."
' 1 3
In Florida Star v. B.J.F' the Court again balanced individual
privacy interests against the first amendment rights of the press. The
newspaper asserted that this balance should be struck once and for all
in favor of free speech, arguing that the press should never be pun-
ished for publishing the truth.t0 5 Once again, however, the Court
99. Id. at 98-99.
100. Id. at 99.
101. Id. at 104.
102. Id. at 104-05.
103. Id. at 102. Since these Supreme Court decisions, at least one state court has reached
an opposite conclusion regarding the publication of the names of sexual assault victims. In
Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226
(1982), an unidentified man attempted to abduct Hyde. Hyde escaped and reported the inci-
dent to the police. The Columbia Daily Tribune obtained the information, including Hyde's
name, from a report provided by the police department. The Tribune ran an article describing
the attempted abduction and included Hyde's name and address. Subsequently, Hyde was
harassed at her home by her alleged assailant, in person and by telephone. Hyde sued the
newspaper for negligently publishing her name; alleging that she had experienced severe emo-
tional distress as a result of the publication. The trial judge granted the Tribune's motion to
dismiss. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the petition stated a cause of
action and that the first amendment allowed the state to impose liability for truthful news
reporting.
However, in Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hospital, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1760 (N.J.
Super. May 14, 1982), the court, following Supreme Court precedent, went one step further.
After the sexual assault the defendant hospital treated the plaintiff for her injuries. A reporter
legally obtained information concerning the attack along with the plaintiff's name and address
from the police and a hospital employee. The plaintiff brought suit against the newspaper and
the hospital for the invasion of her right to privacy. The court denied summary judgment in
favor of the hospital on the grounds that hospital records are confidential and require the
patient's consent for their release. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the newspaper on the grounds that the plaintiff's name and address were "substantially rele-
vant to the story of the crime." Id. at 1762. See Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d
305 (10th Cir. 1981) (the publication of plaintiff's name and picture as a practicing physician
were "substantially relevant" to the topic of medical malpractice).
104. 109 S. Ct. at 2603 (1989) (Justice Marshall wrote the opinion for the majority).
105. Id. at 2608.
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purposefully rejected this broad rule, °6 noting that "the future may
bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipato-
rily."' 17 Nevertheless, while leaving open the possibility that some
future case may justify state-sanctioned punishment of truthful re-
porting, the Court ruled on the facts that free speech prevailed over
the competing privacy interest. 108 The Court adopted as a guiding
principle the statement from Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. "0
that "[i]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitution-
ally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest of the highest order.""'
The Court cited three policy reasons in support of the Daily Mail
principle."' First, only information lawfully obtained receives pro-
tection."12 This limitation enables the government to exert considera-
ble control over the publication of sensitive information. If the
sensitive information is in private hands, the Court said that "the gov-
ernment may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual ac-
quisition, thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail principle the
publication of any information so acquired."'" 3 Moreover, when the
government possesses the information, the government has even
greater power to prevent dissemination. The Court suggested that the
government could institute procedures regarding the release of certain
classified information and provide a damages remedy where the gov-
ernment is responsible for the dissemination of such information." 4
The Court thought the government should bear the primary burden
of preventing the dissemination of what it considers to be sensitive
information.'1 5 Second, no state interest would be furthered by pun-
ishing the press for publishing information that is already made avail-
106. The Court rejected the newspaper's contention that it adopt the broad rule that
"truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment." Id. The
Court had previously refused to adopt this rule in Cox Broadcasting. Id. at 2609. See supra
notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
107. 109 S. Ct. at 2608.
108. The Court rejected The Florida Star's other argument that Cox Broadcasting con-
trolled since it primarily dealt with the role of the press in ensuring fair judicial proceedings
which was not at issue in this case. Id.
109. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
110. 109 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
111. Id. at 2609-13.
112. Id. at 2609.
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able to the public." 6 In the Court's view, it would be better to punish
the government for releasing the information than to punish the press
for publishing it." 7 Finally, the Court feared that the punishment of
truthful publications would have a chilling effect on the media,
1 8
since it would require the press to second guess the legality of publish-
ing information it receives from the government." 9
The Court then proceeded to apply the Daily Mail principle to
the facts at issue. 2 ' First, the Court asked whether the newspaper
"lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public sig-
nificance."'' There was no dispute that the news article about B.J.F.
was accurate, and, even though the Sheriff's Department violated the
Florida statute by releasing B.J.F.'s name to the media, the Court
determined that The Florida Star's receipt of the information was law-
ful.' 2 2 The Court also ascertained that the publication "involved a
matter of paramount public import: the commission and investiga-
tion, of a violent crime which had been reported to authorities."' 23
Second, the Court examined whether the imposition of liability
under section 794.03 furthered "a state interest of the highest or-
der."' 2 4 The Court conceded that the asserted interests of protecting
the privacy and physical safety of rape victims and encouraging vic-
tims to report rapes were "highly significant."' 25 Moreover, the
Court did "not rule out the possibility" that civil sanctions for pub-
lishing a rape victim's name may be appropriate in a future case.'2 6
However, the Court determined that no such interest was present in
B.J.F.'s case since the imposition of damages is not a means narrowly
tailored to ensure a rape victim's anonymity, especially when the gov-
ernment is the source of the information.'27 The Court said that the
"government's issuance of such a release, without qualification, can
only convey to recipients that the government considered dissemina-
tion lawful, and indeed expected the recipients to disseminate the in-





121. Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
122. Id. at 2610-11.
123. Id. at 2611.







Third, the Court decided that applying the negligence per se doc-
trine to violations of section 794.03 resulted in the imposition of strict
liability. This leads to the incongruous result that publishers of de-
famatory falsehoods receive greater protection from liability than
those who publish truth, since the minimum standard of fault for def-
amation is usually negligence.
1 29
Finally, the Court determined that section 794.03 was facially
underinclusive because it only prohibited dissemination of the infor-
mation by "any instrument of mass communications." 1 30 The statute
did not prohibit individuals from spreading the information to others,
even though the resulting harm could be just as devastating.' 3 ' This
raised "serious doubts" whether the statute actually served the inter-
ests purportedly underlying the statute. 3 2 Therefore, the Court re-
fused to impose liability upon The Florida Star for publication of
B.J.F.'s name on grounds that the newspaper lawfully obtained the
information and that such an imposition under section 794.03 failed
to further a state interest of the highest order.
33
Justice White, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, '3  rejected the majority's ruling that imposition of
tort liability on The Florida Star for publishing a rape victim's name
violated the first amendment. 35 Justice White stated that precedent
did not require such a result.1 36 He observed that the published infor-
mation in Cox Broadcasting was obtained from judicial records that
have always been exempt from privacy right protections. 137 Also, the
state law at issue in Cox Broadcasting "made public disclosure of the
victim's name almost inevitable"'' 38 by requiring judicial records to be
128. Id. at 2612.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987)).
131. Id. at 2612-13.
132. Id. at 2612. Justice Scalia, concurring in the decision, stated that since section 794.03
was underinclusive it could not be "regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order.' "
Id. at 2613 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103). Therefore, the Court need not go any
further than this argument to decide the case. Id.
Since the statute would not prohibit neighborhood gossip about the rape victim's plight,
Justice Scalia thought that the "law has every appearance of a prohibition that society is pre-
pared to impose upon the press but not upon itself." Id. at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 2613.






FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
open to the public. 39
The dissent rejected the Court's application of the Daily Mail
principle to the case against The Florida Star on the grounds that the
principle was only intended as a hypothesis and not "constitutional
dogma."' 40 The dissent distinguished Daily Mail because the publica-
tion there disclosed the name of a murderer, not the name of the vic-
tim as in B.J.F.'s case. 14' The Court in Daily Mail specifically stated
that "the holding in this case is narrow. . . . [T]here is no issue of
privacy."' 42 Therefore, Justice White concluded that the Daily Mail
principle was not applicable to the case against The Florida Star.'14 3
The dissent addressed the majority's three main reasons for re-
fusing to impose tort liability on the newspaper.14 First, Justice
White stated that the press should "respect simple standards of de-
cency and refrain from publishing a victim's name, address, and/or
phone number"'145 even when such information is inadvertently re-
leased by the government.' 46 Not only did the Sheriff's Department
post signs stating that the names of rape victims were not to be pub-
lished, but The Florida Star reporter admitted she knew that the
names were not to be taken out of the Department. 147
Second, the dissent rejected the majority's view that the liability
standard applied was too strict.' 48 Justice White observed that the
jury found that The Florida Star acted with "reckless indifference to-
wards the rights of others."' 49 Thus, the Court's concern over the
imposition of strict liability was irrelevant.' 50 Justice White further
observed that the Florida legislature had set the negligence per se
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2615.
141. Id. The murderer was a juvenile who shot and killed a fellow classmate. 443 U.S. at
99.
142. 109 S. Ct. at 2615 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105
(1979)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2615-18.
145. Id. at 2616. Justice White noted that the "Court's concern for a free press is appropri-
ate, but such concerns should be balanced against rival interests in a civilized and human
society. An absolutist view of the former leads to insensitivity as to the latter." Id. at 2616
n.2.




150. Id. at 2617. "B.J.F. proved the Star's negligence at trial-and, actually, far more than
simple negligence; the Court's concerns about damages resting on a strict liability or mere
causation basis are irrelevant to the validity of the judgment for appellee." Id.
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standard of care. 15 1 Therefore, a determination had already been
made for the courts that the publication of a rape victim's name
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 152
Third, Justice White disputed the Court's contention that section
794.03 was underinclusive. 5 3 He believed that since the statute ad-
dressed all media forms it was "tailored almost as precisely as possi-
ble" ' 54 to prevent the widespread dissemination of rape victim's
names.' 55 Regarding the "backyard gossip,"' 56 Justice White stated
that the comprehensive tort law of Florida would deter such individu-
als from spreading the name of a rape victim.' 57 He also stated that
the action brought was for negligent publication and not for the viola-
tion of section 794.03. 58
The dissent argued that the Court's holding'may lead to the ob-
literation of the tort of publication of private facts. 59 Justice White
observed, "[i]f the First Amendment prohibits wholly private persons
(such as B.J.F.) from recovering for the publication of the fact that
she was raped, I doubt that there remain any 'private facts' which
persons may assume will not be published in the newspapers, or
broadcast on television."'" According to the dissent, no public inter-
est exists in publishing the name of a rape victim, nor shielding the
press from liability when the state has tried, but failed, to protect the
privacy rights of such victims.'
6'
Florida Star is most notable for what the Court did not do. As
on each of the three previous occasions where the issue was presented,
the Court refused to address the broad question of whether it is ever
constitutionally permissible for a state to punish, civilly or criminally,
the publication of true information. The Court carefully left open the
door to the possibility of sanctions in future cases, cautioning that
"the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes
between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on lim-






156. Id. at 2612-13. The majority describes a "backyard gossip" as a person who mali-
ciously tells others about an incident of which they have no legitimate concern. Id.
157. Id. at 2617.
158. Id. at 2618.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2619.
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text of the instant case."' 62 Moreover, the Court expressly reserved
the possibility that civil sanctions for publishing the name of a rape
victim may be appropriate in the right case. 6 3 Nevertheless, the
Court's adoption of the Daily Mail test, and the stringent manner in
which the Court applied the test in Florida Star, suggests that the
potential civil liability for publishing the truth may be more theoreti-
cal than practical.
The Daily Mail rule bars state officials from punishing the publi-
cation of truthful information that has been lawfully obtained and is
about a matter of public interest unless such punishment furthers a
state interest of the highest order. i6 Properly applied, the Daily Mail
test can be a sensible approach to balancing individual privacy rights
and first amendment protections of the press. However, the manner
in which the Court applied the test in Florida Star essentially forces
privacy interests to yield unequivocally to the first amendment.
First, the facts surrounding the disclosure of B.J.F.'s name un-
dermine the Court's essential conclusion that the newspaper lawfully
obtained the information. Under Florida law, rape victims' names
were not matters of public record. 65 Signs clearly posted in the Sher-
iff's Department pressroom also warned reporters that rape victims'
names were not to be published. The Court attached no significance
to The Florida Star reporter's admission that she knew B.J.F.'s name
was to be kept confidential, but she copied it anyway. 66 The newspa-
per should not be excused simply because the Sheriff's Department
inadvertently released B.J.F.'s name. As argued in an amicus brief
filed in'the case, "[t]he mere fact that the government makes it easy to
violate a law does not absolve one of responsibility for that viola-
tion."' 67 The Court wrongly concluded that The Florida Star law-
fully obtained B.J.F.'s name.
Second, in deciding that "the news article concerned 'a matter of
public significance' "16 the Court failed to distinguish between the
reporting of the crime itself and the publication of the rape victim's
name. While a crime constitutes "a matter of paramount public im-
162. Id. at 2609.
163. Id. at 2611.
164. Id. at 2609 (citing Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
165. Brief for Appellee at 17-18, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. at 2603 (1989) (No. 87-
329) (citing the Florida Public Records Act, FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(h) (1983)).
166. Id. at 18. See also 109 S. Ct. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
167. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Pacific Legal Foundation, in Support of Appellee at 13, Flor-
ida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. at 2603 (1989) (No. 87-329).
168. 109 S. Ct. at 2611 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
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port, '"'6 9 the identity of the crime victim does not necessarily consti-
tute a matter of such public importance. The public needs to be
informed about criminal occurrences for crime-solving purposes and
to prevent further crimes. However, there is "no social value in re-
vealing a rape victim's identity because it does not add to, and is not
essential to, the rape story."' 7 °
Finally, contrary to the Court's reasoning, the protection of a
rape victim's identity constitutes a "state interest of the highest or-
der."'' Preserving anonymity of the rape victim furthers the state's
interests in encouraging the reporting of rapes and apprehension of
rapists. 17 2 Anonymity also promotes the state's interest in protecting
the victim from further assaults by the assailant who remains at large
and from general harassment by the public.' 7 3
By preventing publication of a rape victim's name, the state can
also minimize the public stigma associated with rape, which is more
severe than other crimes due to the sexual nature of the offense.' 7 4
Rape victims experience intense feelings of shame and degradation. 175
Disclosure of the rape victim's identity only increases the intensity of
these feelings, causing added embarrassment and psychological
harm. 1
76
Courts acknowledge that a "rape victim's situation is unique" ''
7
and that disclosure of the victim's identity detrimentally impacts the
169. Id.
170. Comment, supra note 82, at 1013.
171. 109 S. Ct. at 2604.
172. Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. at 2603 (1989) (No. 87-
329).
173. Id. B.J.F. was forced to seek police protection. Id. Subsequent to The Florida Star's
publication, an unidentified man telephoned B.J.F.'s home threatening to rape her. 109 S. Ct.
at 2616 n.2.
174. Comment, supra note 82, at 1014. "[I]n rape the stigma falls upon the most innocent
victim, who is hence perceived as marred or unchaste ... FORCIBLE RAPE 142 (D. Chap-
pell, R. Geis, and G. Geis eds. 1977).
In the United States alone it is estimated that 154,000 rapes occur each year. C.W. DEAN
& M. DEBRUYN-KoPs, THE CRIME AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE (1982). See also S.
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
175. Comment, supra note 82, at 991 n.23. One judge stated that "[tihe effect on the aver-
age girl is devastating, she will never get over it, the indignities, the knowledge on the part of
her associates; rarely do they ever adjust to a full, happy life." FORCIBLE RAPE 164 (D. Chap-
pell, R. Geis, and G. Geis eds. 1977).
176. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 167, at 7-8. One rape victim testified that the
publication of her name caused her "extreme humiliation and mental distress" along with the
fear of being "regarded as unchaste." Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 473,
368 P.2d 147, 147 (1962), discussed supra note 83.
177. Comment, supra note 82, at 1014 n.152 (citing In re Matter of Pittsburgh Action
Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 41-42, 428 A.2d 126, 139 (1981)).
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victim. 78 This is why our legal system permits the use of pseud-
onyms in place of a rape victim's name when captioning a case. The
Federal Rules of Evidence also recognize the unique vulnerability of
rape victims. 1
79
In Florida Star v. B.J.F 80 the Court once again avoided the
question of whether the Constitution permits a state to punish the
publication of true information. Instead, it adopted a test that pur-
ports to strike a balance between first amendment interests and pri-
vacy interests. As applied in Florida Star, however, that test
undermines the state's ability to protect a rape victim's anonymity
and minimizes the incentive for responsible news reporting by the me-
dia. Rape victims may now have to bear the pain of a double assault,
first by the rapist and then by the media.
Stephanie M. Bartels
178. Id. at 987 n.4 (citing Doe v. Sarasota-Brandenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328,
331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
179. FED. R. EvID. 412. This rule addresses the relevance of a rape victim's past sexual
behavior and restricts its admissibility in court. It is the only rule which specifically addresses
a particular crime.
180. 109 S. Ct. at 2603 (1989).
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